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33-Perfect

In the Matter of the Arbitration
- Between -

9/13/68
J.E. McMahon
ARBITRATOR'S
OPINION AND AWARD

PERFECT FILM LABORATORIES INC.,
- And -

(68-A-16)

MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS,
LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.

On September 4, 1968 a hearing in a matter in dispute between
Perfect Film Laboratories Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Company")
and Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
(hereinafter referred to as "Union") was held before the undersigned,
the permanent arbitrator in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Union Contract"), between the parties.

The

parties were afforded full opportunity to offer argument and evidence
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

APPEARANCES:
For the Company:
COOPER, OSTRIN, DE VARCO & ACKERMAN, ESQS,
By: Harold L. Young, Esq.

For the Union:
PINTO & STEIN, ESQS«
By: Nicholas Pinto, Esq.

ISSUE

Which of the ten (10) employees, if any, listed on
Schedule A submitted by the Union are entitled to severance pay/
pursuant to the Union Contract, and, if so, how much?
FACTS
The basic undisputed facts are as follows:
(a) At a meeting of employees and Union representatives
held on July 22, 1968, Robert Crane President of the Company announced
that the Company's laboratory (54th Street) would discontinue operations
as of the close of business August 2, 1968; that seme employees would be
given work at the Pathe laboratory (another laboratory owned and operated
by the Company); that some employees would continue working at the 54th
Street laboratory under the Pathe contract.
(b)

On July 26, 1968 a meeting of the same parties was held

at which time Mr. Crane advised that the Company had re-considered its
decision to discontinue plant operations on August 2, 1968 and had
decided not to close the laboratory, but to continue operations.
(c) That all of the ten employees who have demanded
severance pay have resigned from the Company and secured employment
elsewhere.
TESTIMONY
The Union stated that the men for whom severance pay is being
sought made arrangements for other employment during the period from
July 22 to July 26; that such action was taken because of, and, in
reliance upon the notice given at the July 22 meeting.

The Company representatives testified that resignations
from these men were received after July 26th; that although they were
requested to continue in Company's employ, they refused.

The resignations

received and the effective dates are as follows:
Name

Effective

James Dagro
Frank Jeannetti
Robert Jeannetti
Nicholas D. Beneditto
Gordon Davis
Gene Zippo
Peter Wilson
Harold Stroud
John Rizzo
Jerry DiGennaro

August 8
"
6
"
8
"
6
"
16
"
16
"
23
"
2
"
16
"
31

After notice had been given that the Company's plant would
close, the Union requested Company employees to refrain from making
applications for work elsewhere in order that the Union could work-out
plans to place the laid-off employees in other jobs on a seniority basis.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES
The Union contends the notice of July 22, that the Company
plant would discontinue its operations,justified employees in seeking
new employment and the men who secured positions elsewhere in reliance
on such notice, are entitled to severance pay; that the notice given on
July 22 was equivalent to being "laid-off?1 that the revocation of the
notice on July 26 could not deprive the employees who had obtained
other employment of severance pay; that the Company was estopped from
not
claiming that these men were in fact/laid off during the period July 22
to July 26; that any instructions given by the Union to its members

were a private matter and of no concern to the Company from which
the Company could acquire no advantage; that the resignations were
submitted as a matter of form din order for the men to secure earned
vacation pay.
The Company claims simply that these employees were in fact
never laid-off; that the notice of July 22 did not and could not
under the Contracts be interpreted as a lay-off; the lay-off would have
taken place on August 2, 1968 if the Company had not changed its
position.

Furthermore, the action of these men in voluntarily sub-

mitting formal resignations, irrespective of reasons for so doing, was
a direct contradiction of their claim that they had been laid-off.

DISCUSSION
The provisions of the Union Contract that are applicable
to this dispute are as follows:
"11.

Severance Pay:

(a) In the event of layoff, the permanent discontinuance
of all plant operations by the Employer for any reason,
permanent disability, retirement (at minimum age 62), or
death of an employee, there shall be paid the following
severance pay:
Severance
Where the employee has worked:
Pay:
1 year but less than 2 years
2 year but less than 4 years
4 years but less than 6 years
6 years but less than 8 years
8 years but less than 10 years
10 years but less -than 12 years
12 years but less than 15 years
15 years but less than 20 years
20 years but less than 25 years
25 years and over

1 Week
2 Weeks
3 Weeks
4 Weeks
5 Weeks
6 Weeks
7 Weeks
8 Woeks
9 Weeks
10 Weeks

"8. Permanent Plant Shutdown:
Where all plant operations are permanently discontinued by the Employer for any reason/ the
provisions of Sections 7 and 11 of this Agreement
shall apply."

OPINION

The primary question to be determined is what is the
affect

of the decision announced on July 22 that the Company plant

would cease operations on August 2, 1968.

Was this decision equivalent

to a "Lay-off" so as to entitle an employee/ who secured or made arrangements for another job prior to the revocation of July 26, to severance
pay.

The Union placed great stress upon the claim that the ten men

involved here were fully justified in relying upon the decision of
July 22 and the Company should be estopped from denying severance pay
to these men who, it is claimed, altered their individual positions by
seeking and obtaining other
the Company.

employment as a result of the action of

This arbitrator could find no precedent or authority that

a lay-off and a notice of lay-off are one in the same.
when employment is terminated.

A lay-off occurs

E: could be either temporary or permanent.

The Company's contractual obligation to pay severance pay is in fact
based upon the loss of employment by an employee.

Admittedly/ no

employee lost his employment as a result of the Company's decision of
July 22.

On the contrary, the ten men who left were urged to stay.
In the case of Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 34 L.A. 321/ the

arbitrator in considering a similar question relative to the date when
employment was deemed to have been terminated, stated:
5-

"The arbitrator believes that the date of the
decision to close the plant is irrelevant.
It is the closing of the department or plant
which deprives the employee of employment,
rather than the decision to do so, which
decision may always be reversed."
Similarly, in Ma11inckrpdt Chemica1 Works, 48 L.A. 11251137, in determining whether an employee would recieve severance pay
held:
". . .it is the actual closing of a plant or
department, rather than the decision to do so,
that deprives employees of employment. We
agree with the Employer's view, as expressed
at the bottom of page 8 of the Company Brief,
that in applying this case, 34 LA 321, to the
case before us, we must find and hold that the date
of actual layoff, and not the decision announced on
April 28, 1966, is the decisive factor that deprived
the Weldon Spring employees of employment. We therefore sustain the view of the Company that it was
correct in paying severance pay where theCompany
took the initiative in laying off an employee, and
that no severance pay whatever, under the contract,
is due to any employee who took the initiative and
quit his job when there was still work to be done and
the Company not only wished him to stay but took no
action to lay such employee off or to terminate his
employment, although everyone knew that it would not be
very long before the entire facility would be shut down."
(Emphasis ours)
In view of the terminology of the Union Contract, I was
not persuaded that a decision or a notice of lay-off is equivalent to
an actual lay-off.

To accept the Unionfs argument would be to add to

the agreement something that is not present therein.
hibited from doing.

This I am pro-

Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary

to pass upon the effect of the resignations submitted by these men.

6.

> .

AWARD
The Award, therefore, is that none of the ten employees
listed on Schedule A submitted by the Union is entitled to severance

pay.
Dated:

September 13, 1968

5EPH E. McMAHON
'Permanent Arbitrator

STATE OF NEW YORK )

ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
On the

day of September 1968, before me personally came

JOSEPH E. McMAHON, to me known, and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, AFL-CIO

and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated October 1, 1968 to October 1,
1971 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Richard Held is reduced to a
suspension. He shall be reinstated without
back pay. The period of tine between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension.
Neither party is "the losing party." Therefore
the fee anc! expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
shared equally.

*

/s

r~7^

^C^C^t^U^^JL^.
Eric
y. Schrnertz
I
Arbitrator

DATED: February 21, 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1

)s= .
) " "

On this 21st day of February, 1969,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the Individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and knov-rj to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Film Technicians, AFL-CIO .
and

I
Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

This is the first case before me in my capacity as the
new permanent Arbitrator under the Industry Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The stipulated issue for determination is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Richard Heid? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 29, 1969 at which time Mr. Heid, i
|
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives j
of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared. Full opportunity was

i

afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses. The parties waived the
Arbitrator's oath and the time for the rendition of the

!

Arbitrator's Award as set forth in Section 15(b) of the con-

i
It

tract.

i

The Company charges the grievant with violations of the
Company Rules; specifically excessive absenteeism and being
•way without authorization from his work station during his
shift on September 19, 1968.

The Company states that in

addition to these violations, it imposed the ultimate penalty
of discharge because of the grievant's prior disciplinary
record, which includes warnings and a suspension for previous

F

- 2infractions.
Irrespective of the magnitude of the grievant's prior
disciplinary record, I am persuaded that but for the specific
incident of September 19, together vith the charge of absenteeism, be would not have been discharged. Therefore, unless
those two specific violations are established up to the stand*
•rd required in discharge cases - by clear and convincing
evidence - the extreme penalty of discharge cannot be upheld.
i

Based on the record before me I an persuaded of the excessive nature of the grievant's record of absenteeism. And
because the Onion does not dispute the days he failed to report for work, for the periods involved, I see no need to recite the specifics of that record. However, the Coopany has
not proved, to the standard that I require, that the grlevant
was away fro* his work station improperly on September 19.
It has proved that he was away from his work area an unusual
number of times and for lengthy periods, but it has offered
no hard evidence to show where he was or that there was no
excusable reason for his conduct. The Company'* judgment
that his absences from his work station were improper and
violative of the tules is merely a conclusion based on the
grievant's prior disciplinary record.

But that conclusion is

founded on mere suspicion, and though the Company may be
right, I am not prepared to uphold a discharge based on mere
suspicion.

The grievant's explanation that certain personal

needs compelled him to leave his work station teveral times
during his shift on September 19, although questionable when
viewed in the light of his prior disciplinary record, is not

- 3 implausible, nor is it overturned by any evidence supporting
the Company's view.

And with the burden on the Company to

!

I
I

prove the charge by clear and convincing evidence, I shall not
i
resolve the doubt to the prejudice of the grievant.
It is well settled that a record of chronic absenteeism,
no matter what its cause, is grounds for an employee's termination if that record continues following warnings and lesser
disciplinary penalties.

But as I have indicated, I believe

the Company would not have fired the grievant on September 20
for his record of absenteeism, even if it may have had
grounds to do so.

Rather its decision was prompted not just

because of a continuing absentee record, but more specifically
because of the grievant's absences from his work station during the course of his shift.

Consequently, as the Company has

not proved the grievant1s culpability with regard to the
latter offense, I shall not uphold the discharge action simply
because I do not believe that absent the latter charge, the
Company would hai'e imposed that penalty.
But manifestly, because the grievant's excessive absentee
record is well established; because of the well settled rule
that an employer may discipline and need not indefinitely retain employees who fail to report for work regularly; and for
a reason unique to this grievant (to which the balance of this
Opinion relates) a disciplinary- penalty in the form of a suspension is warranted under the circumstances of this case.
It is critical to his continued tenure with this Company
for the grievant to forthwith disabuse himself of the notion
that he is entitled to unreasonable special privileges beyond

- 4those accorded other employees.

He compiled an admirable

military service record in Vietnam; was wounded; and suffers a
partial disability as a result. But this does not mean that
the Company must for long tolerate irregular and inadequate
job attendance. The dilemma for the Company and the grievant
would be most pronounced if the grievant's absences were in
fact necessitated by his disability.
1

But I am not persuaded

that that is the case. No doubt a few of his absences were
due to visits to the Veterans Hospital for periodic examinations and medication.

But these represented only a small per-

centage of his total absentee record, and I see no reason why
these visitations, with notice to and approval by the Company,
may not continue.

For I do not consider his request to be

absent for those few times each year to be an unreasonable
special privilege!.
But I am not satisfied that the balance of his absences
were required by his disability.

Frankly I think that be-

cause of some discomfort, perhaps at times connected with that
disability, and for other reasons at other times, the grievant
decided to remain away from work, when he actually could have
reported, in the mistaken belief that he was entitled to special consideration. His testimony at the hearing tended to
disclose this erroneous, albeit honestly held attitude.
So let me take this opportunity to try my hand at directing the grievant toward an understanding of the rules of
employment and a rehabilitation of his attendance record. He
has been warned by the Company; and I believe has undergone
instructional discussions with his Onion. As the permanent

- 5Arbitrator, I shall add my admonition, in the hope that as
the objective and final word, it will be heeded.
The grievant is expressly advised, and the suspension imposed by my Award shall serve as notice, that regular attendance is an absolute requisite to continued employment. This
applies not only to coming to work, but also to attending
to his duties and remaining at his work station when he is at
work. For whatever reason, even if it is beyond his control
or does not involve misconduct, his inability to regularly
•ttend to his Job and duties, would constitute just cause for
dismissal. But I believe that the grievant has the ability
to maintain a normal and satisfactory attendance record.
Accordingly, he is directed to do so. Visits to the Veterans
Hospital for regularly scheduled examinations and medication
shall be worked out with notice to and consent of the Company.
If he must leave his work station to take medication, he
shall notify and obtain the permission of supervision.
If the grievant's attendance record does not improve;
or if without satisfactory explanation he leaves his work
area at times and for periods beyond normal bounds; or for
other breaches of Company Rules or normal work requirements;
I would then be confronted with a strong if not irrebuttable
presumption that he is unable or unwilling to meet his obligations as an employee. And I would have no choice but to uphold any subsequent discharge action taken by the Company.
For all the foregoing reasons the grievant'• discharge
is reduced to a suspension. He shall be reinstated but without back pay. The period of time between his discharge and

-- 6 -

•

.

his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

Eric/O. Schtnertz
Arbitrator

•,-f

„.,

la the Hatter of the Arbitration
- between MOVIELAB, INC.

ARBITRATOR'S
AWARD

LOCAL 702, MOII08 PICTURE LABORATORY
TECHNICIANS, I.A.T.S.E.

(68-A10)

TbU proceed log wa* heli pur«uaot to Article 15 of Collective
ftargaiaiag Agree«eat (herein »«wti»c» referred to «* the "Contrite")
MOVULAB, IHC. 0i*rein«fter referred to »• HCo»pany*') and Local 702, MOTI0H
PICTU8SS LABOtATORY TECHN1C1AMS, I.A.T.S.E. (hereinafter referred to as "Union'}.
Hearing* were held on June 25, July 3, it4S and January 21, 1969.
The Fftrtiet w*r« afforded tull opportunity to offer evidence and to ex^eiine
cro»» aiToifte «ritne*»e*. ft»»t Haarittg h«aor«nda were filed.
APRAXAHCKS :
For the Onion:

ratio
lyj

I. HlchoUi Pinto,

For the Coo^aay:
•D1XTTI. FREIBIM, FTLASluOta,
FtUHAM & GMtTMBK

Byi

trie Boaenfeld, Bcq.

SUBMITTED asm
What shall be the rate lor 35/16H* 3R Color Quad Reduction Printer
doc to the attachment of a Wot Gatet
Whst shall be the effective date of such ratet

On or about !fove»b«r 28, 1967, Company notified Union that it wa#
putting into operation a debris 35/16HK Color Quad Reduction Printer and paying
the operator thereof the Group 5 rate.
The Union did not question that rate until aoae aonths later wfc*n it
learned fron the ship steward that said machine had a "Wet G.*te'" attachment,
thereupon it attempted to negotiate a higher rate as DeLuxe laboratories vas
paying a premium rate to the operators of machinet hairing a similar attachment.
S»t being successful in this attempt, the Union instituted this proceeding.
^et Gate" attachment is in the form of a "Bo*", sonetine* referred
to as "aquerie*", which contains solution of ferchloroethylene (soeetiaea referred
to herein as "Chemical Solution") tfarou^ «fcich the file is run.
Vet Gate is closed while the naefaiae is running,

The door on the

the solution is drained off

into an overflow system after the machine is shut down.

The door is then opened,

aad the inside of the »qu«rlu* cleaned by the operator,

the ferchloroethylene

solution give* off m odor or snell *feich is offensive to aooe degree.

Occasionally,

there vas break down In the overflow system with result the ehevical solution
spilled on floor.

When this occurred, tike odor was greater.

The Cosy any, in an effort to reduce the odor to a ainimes, installed
a tuo-exh»ust ventilation system to dry film after going through the aqu*riuo.
It also redesigned the overflow systsn by Installing new valve system, as a faulty
valve was found 6s be Che cause of overflowing.
no overflowing.

Since August, 1968 there has been

The Company had tine* 1963 operated liquid printing machine with an
attachment which Coospany equates with • "Met Gate" and the operators thereof
were paid contract rat*.
POSITION OF THE PAtTIES
The Union contend*:
(1) That Arbitrator Bust decide if the machine with its Wet
Gate attachment it a new or reconstructed machine within the meaning of Section
17(c) of the contract;
(2) Ihat said Machine is, in fact, a new or reconstructed
machine;
(3) Ihat if it is not »uch a new or reconstructed machine,
then Arbitrator oust award the sane rate em other labs having same equipment pay
therefore;
(4) That the operator of the Vet Gatt printer is entitled to
additional compensation, i.e. ,-a prtaniun rat* of pay because it exits offensive
odors and causes skin irritation of various degrees when it contacts the operator's
skin.

•

The Company contends:
(1) that this is not a case where the Arbitrator has rate
Jurisdiction under the contract*s tectioa 17(c), which authorises the Arbitrator
to fix rates for nev, unusual and reconstructed equipment and for (accelerated)
existing equipment, unions it is the save as presently or may hereafter be
operated in any other laboratory.

The attachment of a wot gate to e Debric doee

not nake it new (or unusual or reconstruct^) within the meaning of 17(c). Such
a Debrie remains s piece of existing equipment.
(2) H»at tttonld the Arbitrator hold that a Bebrie with a wet
gate is new or reconstructed equipment over which the Arbitrator nay take rate
jurisdiction under 17(c), that the proper rat* would be the Group 5 rate.

(3) That the rate for the»a two Debrle printer* with wet

gates should be the rate stated la the contract for Color Printer - one or tvo
machine* - one operator, I.e., the Group 5(e) rate...because a Debrie with a wet
gate is etill a Color Printer within the meaning of the contract's Group 5(c).
PISCUSSIOM
The first question to b« decided is the applicability of Section 17(c)
Of the contract to the issue. The pertinent parts of that section are as follows:
"Employer shall be permitted to install and
Operate new, unusual aad reconstructed equipment,
and accelerate the speed of existing equipment after
negotiating wages and condition* with respect
thereto with the Onion.......However, if such new,
unusual, reconstructed or accelerated equipment
or machinery is the same as presently or a*y
hereafter be operated in any other laboratory
with which the Union has a collective bargaining
agreement, then the Employer shall have the
right, upon notification to the Union and upon
the mutual agreement that said machinery or
equipment is the same, to operate such equipment
in the same manner as the other laboratory upon
payment of the base rate of wages applicable to
the machine or equipment operated in such other
laboratory."
The Company argues that the Wet Sate attachment does not make the
Debrie Printer "new or unusual** any more than attaching a heater or radio makes
a ear new or unusual. Furthermore the attachment is superficial to the machine
and does not involve the whole machine. The analogy is not apt. One could think
of a number of other attachments such as double-barrel carburetors, mufflers,
etc., which could make a car new, unusual or reconstructed. As Company1* argument
is not p«rsuasiv«, it is my decision that section I7(c) is applicable.
It, therefore, is necessary to determine what should be a proper rate
for the operator of the machine or machines in question. The thrust of the Union's
for higher pay rests exclusively upon the claimed offensive odor of

Ferchloroethyiene and die claim that said chemical solution causes skin irritation
of various degrees when it contacts the operator's skin. The testimony of the
witnesses failed to support these claims,

The testimony of Mrs, Scala, an operator

of the machine in question for the past fix months, was particularly significant.
She stated that the swell (odor) was "not offensive" and the chemical burns one's
cuts "for a minute". Moreover, the Union witnesses testified that no operator lost
any time or consulted a doctor as a result of t*elliag or of physical contact with
the chemical solution.
Admittedly, Ferdtloroethylene unventilated or overflowed smells a
good deal. However, the testimony sad evidence indicated that the ventilation
Systeni installed by the Company has reduced the swell to the minimus and the
redesigned overflow system has reduced the possibility and frequency of an overflow.
Finally, there was no evidence offered that the Wet Gate attachment
requires more work, greater skill or imposes greater responsibility of the
operator than operation of machine without the "Wet Gate".
Regarding the higher rate paid by Reeves and DeLuxe to the operators
of a Wat Gate printer, the testimony with respect thereto has been disregarded.
In case of Reeves, it was entirely hearsay, and in case of DeLuxe, there was a
complete lack of proper foundation. Ho proof or testimony was presented to
demonstrate that machines were the same; nor was there any competent testimony
relative to die facts or circumstances that resulted in the payment of a higher
rate by those companies.

AWARD

The Award, therefore, is as follows:
The rate for the 35/16 3R
color quad reduction printer
due to attachment of a W-t bate
•hell be contract rate for color
printer — i.e. • Group 5.

Dated:

February'/'?* 1969
JOSEFn E. hcliAHON, Arbitrator

STATE OF HEW YORK

cousm OF wx YORK.
On tbe//v day of February 1969, before me personally cssie Joseph L.

McHahon, to &e known, and knowri to oe to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he duly acknowledged to ce that he executed
the ssaue.

-6-

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR. MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technician*
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Ubdersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly beard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The present assignment of duties to the Raw
Stock Clerks is neither violative of Section
17(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
nor of established custom and practice. The
Company aay continue the present operation
of the Raw Stock Room with one clerk on each
shift, pending an early hearing before ae on
the question of whether the work load of the
clerks is normal or excessive.

.-r

--r .

•r

Eric a. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April ^1969
STATE OF Mew York
COUNTY OF Hew York

)„ .
)

On tills s*"day of April, 1969, before ae personally came
and appeared Brie J. Schmertz to ae known and known to ae to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to «e Chat he executed the same.
Case #69-Al(d)

,-;..rC-.-— --*
NC. ;'•-"

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Do the present assignment* of duties to the
low Stock Clerics violate the contract? If
so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing vas held on April 4, 1969 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Prior to March 1968 the Company operated two Raw Stock
Supply Rooms, one for black and white raw stock and the other
for color. The former was located on the 7th floor and the
latter on the 8th. Each was manned by Raw Stock Clerks. In
March 1968, the two Stock Rooms were combined into one on the
6th floor.

Though the rooms were consolidated, the work of

the two Raw Stock Clerks on each of the first two shifts remained divided; one distributed color stock and the other distributed black and white stock. On the third shift the single
clerk distributed both types of stock.
Effective March 31, 1968 the Company laid off the two
Junior clerks end re-arranged the assignments so that one
Raw Stock Clerk manned each of the three shifts. As a consequence both of the single clerks assigned to die first and
second shifts were and are required to handle both black and
white and color stock.

In other words, before the leyoff,

- 2a clerk on the first or second shift handled either black
and white or color stock; but since the layoff the regaining
clerk is required to do both, The Union contends that the
Company's action Is violative of Section 17(b) of the contract and contrary to established custom and practice. Also
it claims that the layoff is not supported by a bona fide
diminution in vork within the Haw Stock Clerk classification,
and that consequently the present work load is excessive.
I agree with the Company that Section 17(b) is not
applicable, that Section, both by title and content relates
to the operation of machines. Though the first sentence of
Section 17(b) begins with the phrase "The parties agree that
present methods of operation within the laboratories shall
continue without change ...," the balance of the clause, together with a full reading of the entire Section, including
paragraphs (a), (c), (d), makes it clear that "methods of
operation" relates to the operation of machines. As the job
involved in this case is neither a machine job nor part of a
machine operation, faction 17(b) does not apply.
•or can I agree with the Onion's assertion that the
present arrangement, requiring the clerk to handle both color
and black and white stock is contrary to practice and custom.
The only present variation la on the first and second shift.
The third shift work, mil along, required the clerk to do
both. And the third shift clerk is classified no differently
than the clerks OB the first and second shifts.
Moreover, I find nothing in the contract which prohibits
the Company from requiring the Raw Stock Clerk to perform

." .
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- 3both assignments.

The contract provides for a single classi-

fication at • specified rate of pay.

It makes no distinction

between Raw Stock Clerks who handle color stock and those who
handle black and white.

There is no dispute that responsibil-

ity for black end white stock and color stock are both properly within the single classification of Raw Stock Clerk. Therefore, just as « clerk has been called upon to perform either
duty, he may now be required to perform both, provided the
vork load Involved Is not excessive.
The last point, namely the quantity of the present work
load of the clerks on each of the three shifts, relates to
the Union's final charge that the layoff was unsupported by
any significant diminution of work, and hence is improper.
The Company has a contractual right to reduce its work force
when the available work falls off.

In the instant case the

Company claims that the available black and white and color
stock work is sufficient to support only one full time clerk
on each shift.

And that this resulted from a diminution in

the work of die Printing Department (which the Stock Room
services) and a re-aasignaent of "einexlng" and splicing.

I

make no determination now of this question, simply because the
evidence offered by both sides was Insufficient.
may continue the present operation

The Company

of the Raw Stock Room, but

the parties shall come before me at an early hearing on the
question of whether the present work load of the Raw Stock
Clerks Is normal or excessive.

Eric j. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR. MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technician* I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

C9-A*
Award

and

De Luxe General Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties. Awards
as follows:
The grievance in ease 169A-2 does not fall within Section 17(c) of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Accordingly the Union's claia regarding the present operation of the machine* during
lunch is denied.
The Arbitrator's fee in this case shall be borne
by the Doion.

DATED: April I" 1969
STATE OF Rev York
COUNTY OF Hew York

)
)BS.t

On this S"~day of April, 1969, before m* personally came
and appeared Brie J. Schaert* to me known and known to ue to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to M that he executed the saote.
Case f69A-2

.
A in N«»**'J

.. *»•*

In the Hatter of the Arbitration
betvecn
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technician*, I.A.T.S.K., AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Da Luxe General Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated Issue 1st
Does Grievance 69A-2 fall within Section 17(c)
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
It is stipulated that if the Arbitrator decides
that question in the negative, the Onion's claim
regarding the present operation of the machines
during lunch is denied. If answered in the
affirmative, the parties shall negotiate conditions for the operation of the machines during
lunch as provided by Section 17(c).
A hearing was held at the Company offices on February 28,
1969 at which time representatives of the parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The parties
filed post bearing briefs.
The machines in question are three Duplex color positive
developing machines.

The question for determination la

whether certain changes in equipment on those machines which
have occurred since the Award of Arbitrator Joseph B. McMahon
in case 067A-25, dated August 23, 1967, together with the
changes which were before him in that proceeding, make the
Duplex machines new, unusual and reconstructed equipment or
accelerated within the meaning of Section 17(e) of the contract.
There is no dispute that since the McHahon Award the
kachines have not been accelerated beyond the speed of 175,

- 2 •
which that Award held to be normal under the terms of the
contract.

So there has been no new acceleration in the

•peed of the machines, which standing alone, would now warrant the application of Section 17(c) of the contract.

The

main thrust of the Union's argument is one of cumulative
•ffect.

It argues that the accelerated speed of the mach-

ines plus the other changes weighed by Mr. McMahon, together
with subsequent changes in certain parts of the machines,
transform those machines into new, unusual and/or reconstructed equipment.
I have considered the changes which were before Mr. McMahon
when he denied the union's request for an increase in the
Duplex machine crew complement, namely:

1. The increase in machine speed from J.50 to 175.
2. An increase in the temperature of the developing solution.
3. Extra requirements of the IBM cards.
4. Extra supplies entailed in the use of "black
bags," and dimmer lights.
5. Extreme difficulty in making double splices;
together with the changes subsequent thereto, namely:

1. Alteration of the film feed mechanism from
sprocket gears to a friction system
2. Installation of a different type gear clutch.
3. A change in the position of the gear clutch.
4. Installation of a jet spray washer ("bird bath")
5. Installation of a squeege film drying system;
and I have concluded that the overall and basic function
and operation of the Duplex machines, which are of 1955

I
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vintage remain fundamentally unchanged, and consequently do
not constitute new, unusual or reconstructed equipment within the meaning of Section 17(c) of the contract.
Accordingly the Onion's grievance In case f69A-2 Is
denied.
~

Eric J S c h m e r t z
U
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Award

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The discharge of Renaldo Ojeda is changed to a
layoff effective December 23, 1968, the date he
was terminated. Pursuant to the recall procedure he is entitled to be recalled to fill open
jobs he can perform. As of the date of the hearing a job as Wet End Black and White Developer
on the third shift was open or available. Therefore Mr. Ojeda may elect to come off layoff immediately and claim that job, at the regular rate of
pay for that classification, without back pay. In
the alternative he may remain on layoff, subject
to his right of recall to a job he is qualified to
perform, without back pay, in "accordance with the
established recall procedure, when and if such job
becomes available.
The fee and expanses of the Arbitrator shall be
shared equally by the parties.

Eric/0. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April 5 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this f** day of April, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 69-A5

7*

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Renaldo Ojeda? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on March 3 and March 31, 1969, at
which time Mr. Ojeda, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Also, with the agreement of the parties, Samuel Miller, Esq.,
a personal attorney for the grievant, was present at both
hearings as an observer.
Based on two "negligence reports" and four warning letters, including a suspension, all during the year 1968, and
all for certain alleged errors in his work as a Relief Color
Developer, the grievant was discharged.
I am persuaded that the grievant made the mistakes which
are the subject of those negligence reports and letters of
warning.

It is obvious to me that the grievant w«» not and

is not able to perform the duties of a Relief Color Developer,
especially the specific task of operating the Applicator
which develops sound track, under the methods the Company pre-

- 2 scribes for the third shift.

Specifically, the evidence, in-

cluding the grievant's own testimony, reveals that the grievant is unable to adjust to the procedure of interchanging
sound and silent (dailies) developing, which requires activating or disengaging the Applicator more frequently than if
long unbroken periods are devoted to either sound or silent.
And there is no challenge by the Union in this proceeding to
that method of operation.

Also, it appears that some oerson-

ality conflict exists between the grievant and the third
shift color developing supervisor, Mr. Marino, at least on
those occasions when the grievant is under what he considers
to be the pressures of the Relief job.

In tny judgment, there-

fore, there can be little serious dispute with the wisdom of
removing the grievant from that particular assignment.
The classic approach

is to uphold the discharge of an

employee, who, following warnings and a suspension, is unable
to perform his job duties satisfactorily.

And this Arbitrator

has so ruled in a long line of ad hoc cases.

However, there

are times when the classical rule is either inappropriate or
unfair because of other overriding equitable considerations.
In my view the instart case is such an exception.
Prior to 1968 the grievant worked for the Company for
ten years as a Developer without any recorded trouble whatsoever.

For ten years his work was totally satisfactory, and

the Company does not dispute his present competence as a
Developer.

In short, he has established his ability as a

Developer over many years of service; but the Relief job on
the Color Developer he cannot do satisfactorily.

His ten years

- 3 of satisfactory service and his established competence as? a
Developer are not the only equitable factors.

Additionally,

is the total absence of misconduct or wilfull neglect on his
part in his failure to adequately perform the Relief job.
did not refuse to perform his work assignments.
leave his work area without permission.

He

He did not

He did not extend

break or lunch periods beyond prescribed limits.

He has no

record of excessive absenteeism or tardiness.

He did not en-

gage in proscribed activities while on duty.

And there is no

!
!

evidence that he did not try, to the best of his ability,
albeit inadequately, to perform the duties required of him.
In other words, he tried but failed on this particular job:
whereas he had succeeded on others.

And it follows that though

he may be unsuited to the Relief job, he has not been and is
not unsuited to this Industry.
For these reasons, unique to this case, I do not find
the penalty of discharge to be appropriate or fair.

Though

the grievant must be removed from the Relief job, he and his
competence in other capacities should not be lost to the
Industry.

Nor, as would be the case if the discharge WSE up-

held, should the Industry be lost to him as a source of employment after he has devoted so many satisfactory years to it.
What is proper is to disqualify the grievant from the
third shift Relief Color Developer Job as it is presently constituted.

And assuming other jobs were filled when he was re-

moved, to place him on layoff because of inability to perform
available work.

Thereafter he would be entitled to recall,

without back pay, in accordance with the established recall

- 4procedure, to a

job he is qualified to perform.

That then is what I direct.

The grievant's discharge is

changed to a layoff effective December 23, 1968, the date he
was terminated.

As of the date of the hearing a job as Wet

End Black and White Developer on the third shift was ooen or
available.

Therefore, the grievant may elect to come off lay-

off immediately and claim that job, at the regular rate of
pay for that classification, without back pay.

Or in the

alternative, he may remain on layoff, subject to his right of
recall to a job he is qualified to perform, without back pay,
in accordance with the established recall procedure, when
and if such job becomes available.

•ft

Ericya. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

T-51
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Movielab, Inc.
and
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1963 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The #5 and #6 color negative developing machines
as they are presently operated and positioned,
are not a "two strand" operation within the meaning of the Schedule A "Note" (on page 27 of the
contract) and the Company may not operate them
with a crew of 5 men, "Tie Company shall continue
to operate each machine with a crew of 3 men or
both machines with a crew of 6.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric X- Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June ~1969
STATE OF Hew York
COUNTY OF New York

>ss,

On this i day of June 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case f 69A-

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Movielab, Inc.
and

Opinion

Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
The stipulated issue is:
May the Company under the contract, operate the
#5 (16aoi) and the #6 (35oua) color negative developing machines with a crew of five men?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on March 25,
1969 at which time representatives of the Union and Company
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The Union
and the Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," filed post hearing briefs. The parties expressly
waived the time limit for the rendition of the Arbitrator's
Award as set forth in Section 15(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
The Company claims the right to operate the two color
negative developing machines with a crew of five men under
the following contractual provision of Schedule A:
"Hotes

Color Negative Developing:
3 Man Crew: One Strand
5 Man Crew: Two strand,"

It contends that the operation of the two machines in
question constitutes "two strand" color negative developing
within the meaning of the foregoing "Mote."
The Union disagrees. It views the operation as that of
two machines producing one strand each; thereby necessitating

- 2a crew of three men for each machine or six men for both.
The Schedule A "Rote" has been the subject of interpretation in a prior arbitration Award between the same parties.
In Case #66A-15, my predecessor, Mr. McMahon, in an Award
dated November 7, 1966 held that the Company could not operate two color negative developing machines with a crew of
five men when those machines were separated by some ?5 feet
and between which three other unrelated machines were located.
Mr. McMahon found that the two color developing, machines involved in that case were a "split operation" requiring three
men on each machine. He stated;
"The Agreement is silent as to how close the
"two strand" operations must be or how far
apart they may be in order to come within the
purview of the "Note? ....thereof. I can find
nothing in the Agreement to clarify this point.
The Company's contention if correct would mean
that so long as it had two color negative developing machines in the laboratory, irrespective of whether they were located in different
rooms - different floors - the five iaan crev
complement would apply. In my opinion, this
position is untenable ...."
Mr. McMahon also stated:
"There is no dispute that, if these two machines were operated side by side, the Company's
contention would be correct."
In the instant case the Company does not contend that
it has the right to operate two machines with five men regardless of where the machines are located. Rather it claims
that it has now complied with Mr. McMahon's dictum that the
machines be "side by side."

It argues that the f5 and #6

color negative developing machines are not only positioned
"side by side" but are indeed "adjacent" and "contiguous"

- 3which qualifies them to be operated by * crew of five,
Mr. McMahon's opinion, in which he stated that the
Company would have the right to operate the two machines with
a crew of five a»en if they were "side by side" did not define or provide an example of what "side by side" sneant.
Both parties deem it synonymous with "adjacent" and "contiguous" though they disagree on the application of these words
to the disputed machines.
But I find that by practice, both before and after
Mr. McMahon's Award in Case #66A-15, the parties have attached specific meaning to those synonymous phrases.

The record

discloses that with the exception of the instant case before
me and Case #66A-15, no "two strand" operation of color negative developing machines was or is carried on without a
"common bridge" for the two machines involved.

And as the

Company lost Case #66A-15 (where there was no coonnon bridge
for the two machines) all instances prior to the instant dis:

pute, in which two color negative developing machines were
properly operated on a two strand basis, the relief or bridge
man was able to observe or attend both machines from a common
:

bridge, even if, as the Company now claimss he has no r»articui

lar duties or responsibilities to do so.

To my mind this

clarifies the conditions under which the machines were "side
by side, or adjacent or contiguous."

It means that the

machines were not only positioned next to each other with no
other machine or equipment in between, but that because of
a common bridge, both machines were openly accessible to
each other; each was observable and attendable from the

- 4other or from a location between then; and the proximity oi
each to the other was unimpaired.

In short by unvaried past

practice, these conditions were present when two color negative developing machines were . side by side or adjacent or
contiguous to each other as, a "two strand operation." And
therefore I conclude that unless these or comparable conditions obtain, the operation of two color negative develooing
machines would not qualify as "side by sice, adjacent, contiguous'' or a "two strand" operation, and a crew of fivt
would not be contractually permitted.
Indeed, this meaning to the words "side by side, adjacent
or contiguous," which I find the parties have given by practice, is quite consistent with the preferred dictionary definition.

"Adjacent" is held to be Synonymous with "adjoining."

B 'th words are defined as aeaning ''in contact; attaching,'' as
well as "lying next to" or "bordering uoon." (Webster's
Universal Unabridged Dictionary).

Similarly, the preferred

definition of "contiguous" is "attaching; actual contact of
bodies; a meeting or joining without intervening space."
(Same dictionary).
So there is a marked similarity between what "side by
side, adjacent or conti£juousTC has meant to the parties by
practice, and the dictionary definition.
As I see it, the physical positions of the #5 and #6
negative developing machines, as presently operated, are not
side by side, adjacent or contiguous within the foregoing

i
meaning.

The machines are next to each other but they are

- 5separated for virtually their entire length by an impenetrable
floor to ceiling wall.

The only access from one machine to

the other is around the dry ends.

This means that only a dis-

tance of about three feet of the total 25 foot length of each
machine is openly accessiblej observable and in unimpaired
proximity one to the other.

With the wall intervening, I fail

to see how the two machines can be construed as "side by side"
within Mr. McMahon'e dictum, or "side by side, adjacent or
contiguous" 86 reco;.;nizec and defined by both past practice
in this laboratory and common interpretation.
It is not for this Arbitrator to decide whether this particular operation can be run by five men, and whether a sixth
man is superfluous.

For even if only five men are needed,

the Company's right to use that number instead of six is limited to a "two strand" operation involving two machines that
are run side by side on a dual basis.

Unless the Company can

establish that condition, it tnay not reduce the crew of 6
(3 on each separate machine) irrespective of the quantity of
the work (or lack thereof) for the'oth man while he works on
the bridge of either.

Put another way, a reduction of a con-

tractually mandated six man crew, except as authorized by the
contract, is a matter for collective bargaining and not arbitration.
I do not find the Union's demand regarding the "Note,"
in the negotiations for the current contract, to be at all inconsistent with the foregoing interpretations and conclusions.
There is no dispute that the Union sought the following change
in that "Note:"

- 6 -

"Coarplecoent of one and two strand color operations 1 Strand - 3 men
2 Strand - 5 sen provided aaachines are on the
same level, have a coraaon bridge and are not
separatee by wall or divider and are not m.' re
than 5 feet apart." (Underscoring supplied*',
The Company claims that by naaking but failing to achieve
this demand, the Union acknowledged that two strand color
developing operations could be run even though the machines
involved die not have a consnon bridge and/or were separatee*
by a wall or divider.

I do not agree.

In the light oi the

events that took place prior to the negotiations of the
current contract, this demand by the Union was manifestly,
in my judgment, nothing more than an atteorot to codify into
the written agreement the practice which had been going on
up to that time.

The Union had been sustained by Mr. McMahon

in Nove«aper, 196o.

Yet the Company was so troubled by that

Award that it und ertook the unusual step of legal action in
the courts to upset it.

Though that failed, it is snsall

wonder that the Union sought to projtect itself against a
repetition of a similar attempt by the Company especially
when it was confronted in August 1968 with the Compare's intention to run the disputed machines as a dual operation.
Ac I see it, the Union wanted to clarify the "Note" so as
to make clear, based on existing practice, the circumstances
under which two color developing machines were properly a
"two strand" operation and when they would not b«.

So, con-

sidering the entire history of this particular problem, I
do not find that the Union's demand in 1968 was an attempt

- 7 to achieve a new benefit or new condition of employment;. Instead I conclude that it was an effort to reduce to contract
language a clarification of the meaning of a "tvo strand"
operation, based on practice and the McMahon Award of November,
1966.
For all the foregoing reasons, the £5 and #6 color negative developing saachines as the> are presently operated and
positioned,, are not a "two strand'1 operation within ;he meaning of the Schedule A "Note" (on pa.xe 21 of the contract) and
the Company taay not operate them vith a crew of 5 men.

The

Company shall continue to operate each machine with a crev of
3 men or both machines with a crew of 6.

Eric JT Schmerta
Arbitrator

PERHAKRJJT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Hatter of the Arbitration
between

Movtelab, Inc.
and

Award

Local 702 Motion »icture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 to October 1,
1971 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Avards as follows:
In the circumstances and under the conditions set
forth in the attached Opinion, the Company does
not have the right to assign reverted employees
out of seniority to their immediately previous
higher classification (from which they reverted)
pursuant to Article '3, Temporary Transfers.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric f. Schnertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July "^ 1969
STATE OF Hew York
)BS<:
COUNTY OF Sew York
)
On this *- day of July, 1969, before me personally case
ind appeared Eric J. Schaertz to me known and known to me to
>e the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
iInstrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
Same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Movielab, Inc.
and

Opinion

Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
The stipulated issue i§:
Does the Company have the right to assign reverted employees out of aeniority to their
immediately previous higher classification
(from which they reverted) pursuant to Article
13 Temporary Transfers?
A hearing vat held at the Company's offices on April 1,
1963 at which tine Che parties made oral statements; stipulated the issue; agreed to submit the case to the Undersigned
on briefs; and waived the contract time limit for the rendition of the Award. On May 8, 1969 the Company filed its
brief and on May 18 the Union filed its reply brief.
The events are not in dispute.

What is in dispute ie

whether an assignment of a reverted employee to his immediately
previous higher classification ahould be a "temporary transiei"
or a "recall from reversion."

If the former, the Union con-

cedes that seniority need not be observed.
Because of a diminution of work in the Printing Department
three employees, classified as Printers vere noticed for layoff from that classification under Section 7 (Work Distributlon and Layoff) of the contract.

In accordance with theii

rights under that Section they chose to "revert" to lower
classifications which they had previously held, in the
negative Workers Department.

i
j

- 2Among these three employees. Mattes! possessed the most
seniority. Thereafter, sometime In July 1963, work for one
night became available In the Printer classification. To
that work the Company assigned not Mattesl, but one of the
other reverted employees, junior In seniority. The Company
contends that that assignment was merely a temporary transfer
under Section 13 of the contract, and that such transfers may
be made without regard for seniority. The Union claims that

|

the availability of work In the Printer classification entitled

!

the most senior employee laid off from that classification to
be "recalled" to It from reversion, and that the grievant,
with the aost seniority was thereby entitled to the assignment.
I am not persuaded that Section 13 (Temporary Transfers)
was intended to apply to the circumstances of this case. For
overriding I believe, is the equitable right of the employee
been
who has/involuntarily reduced in classification (b, reversion)
because of lack of work in the higher classification, to return to the latter when work Is again available.
Matteei and the two other Printers were removed from that
higher classification and reverted to the lower classified
negative Workers Department simply because there was no work
for them as Printers. Though the contract i& silent on the
procedure for recall from reversion. It cannot be realistically
assumed that no practice or procedure has been followed or
that reverted employees have not be accorded a chance to return to their former and higher classified jobs.

In this re-

gard the Company did not challenge the Union's statement, that
recalls from reversion have been processed in accordance with

- 3seniority, i.e., the most senior qualified reverted emplo>ee
is first recalled to the higher Job he held and from which he
reverted when work fell off.
So, considering the practice of permitting the reverted
employees, based on seniority to reclaim the higher classification from which they had been laid off because of lack of
work, when work again becomes available, the temporary transfer provisions of the contract which do
not recognize
or rer
"
quire adherance to seniority are simply not appropriate.
My conclusion is reenforced I believe, by the fact that
MbT
the Company may, and hasjiitt temporary transfers under
Section 13 of the contract to cover work assignments for an
extended period of time.

Indeed Paragraph (d) of Section 13

allows the Employer to make a temporary transfer of an enployee from a lower classification to a higher classification
for three or more days per week for a period of thirteen consecutive weeks before required to ^rant the employee a promotion to a higher claesification.

If this temporary transfer

provision is applicable to the reactivation of a classification where work had previously fallen off and from which employees were caused to revert because of lack of work therein,
an employee from a lower classification, irrespective of seniority, could be assigned to the newly available work in that
higher classification for up to thirteen consecutive weeks,
in preference to an employee who had reverted when previously
there was no work in that higher classification. It could
mean that for up to thirteen weeks an employee laid off from
the Printer classification because of lack of work, could not

,-;tJi^yK€^-:
reclaim M§ job Whan work again bacama available, because It
had been assigned to • lower classified and possibly lass
senior employe* cm the basis of a "temporary transfer." And
it may also mean that he could never reclaim it, if the tan*
porary transferee received a permanent promotion after the
thirteen week period.

The inequity inherent in that circum-

stance is quite obvious to ma and I would hope to the parties
as veil.
In short, 1 think it an improper use of the temporary
transfer clause of the contract if the result is to depriy*
an employee laid off from a higher classification and revert•d to a lover classification, of the chance to return to the
higher rated job when work again becomes available.
It should be recognised that the inappropriateness of
Section 13 under the facts la this case, is exceedingly narrow.
It means that where employees have been involuntarily removed
from a higher classification because of Isck of work therein,
subsequent available work in that classification should be
first assigned to the senior smrployea who reverted from that
classification to a lower one. It doesy,constitute a ruling
one way or another on temporary transfers to cover work or
vacancies caused by the wide range of other circumstances.
One question remains, and that is whether this reasoning
ought to apply when, as under the facts in the instant case,
only a single night's work becomes available(even though the
stipulated issue does not embody a quantity of work.) I think
it should. The quantity, frequency and scheduling of work in
this laboratory appears to be cyclical and subject to change
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upo& custoutr u*ed». The various paragraphs of

Section 7 of the contract contemplate, at least in my mind
the "up and down" nature of the work in this industry.

The

provision therein for rotating and sharing the available vork
among qualified employees, so as to afford at least three
days vork per week for all the employees, suggests a recognition of, as veil as a method to cope with, the ebb and flov
of business. So it would appear that a single night's work
is not an uncommon occurrence, nor can it be deemed an insignificant quantity within the frame of available work for the
employees. Therefore I am not prepared to hold that a single
night's work is so insubstantial as to not require recall of
the senior employee who previously performed that work, but
who was laid off and reverted to a lover classification vhen
no work was available.
Of course the parties should recognize that all of this
must be administrated in accordance with a rule of reason. Under normal circumstances the employee laid off from the higher
classification because of lack of work and reverted to t> lover
classification, has, as indicated, a priority right based on
his seniority to reclaim work in the higher classification when
and if it become? available.

But there may be extraordinary

circumstances under which this right cannot be reasonably exercised. If because of short notice, or an emergency, or
•ome other bona fide unusual circumstance, the Company is unable to offer the assignment to the senior reverted employee;
or if by example, the latter employee cannot be spared from
or replaced on his lover classified work, the Company may have

•«DO choic* but Co fill the assignment in some other way.

But

if the available work in the higher classification continues
beyond a short run, none of these extraordinary circumstances
may be used as a basis to fail to make arrangements which
would allow the senior reverted employee to reclaim the work
of the higher classification, which he lost in Che first instance, only when and because no work was available.
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Eric /. Schaertz
Arbitrator"
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
N

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

"
"
it
it

De Luxe General, Inc.

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated In
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into b> the
above-tiaiaed parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The 40 hour cumulative guarantee on a five day
basis at straight tine under Section 18 is a
right and privilege to which the grievants are
entitled. Therefore, the grievants, Messrs
Robert Rubinstein, Edward Haucb and Martin Garrett
should have been paid that guarantee for the days
Monday through Friday of the week in which Washington' s Birthday fell in the year 1969. Anc in
addition, under Section 5 of the contract, they
are entitled to holiday pay for Washington's
Birthday. Therefore they should receive a total
of 6 days pay for that week. The Company is directed to make the appropriate payment.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Arbitrator

is

Is1.-"!

DATED: September 1-1969
STATE OF Mew York
COUNTY OF Hew York

)*s.:

Oa this *- day of September, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schaertz to me known and known to
me to be Che individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

H
It

and

tf

Opinion

ft

De Lux* General, Inc.

«t

The issue as stipulated by the parties Is;
Are the three grievants, Robert Rubinstein,
Edward Hauch and Martin Garrett entitled to
8 hours pay for Washington's Birthday 1969?
Hearings were held at the American Arbitration Association and the Laboratory on June 18 and 20, 1969, at which time
representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition of the Award were waived and
the parties filed post hearing briefs.
The parties recognize that as worded, the issue does not
precisely define the dispute. Actually the grievants, who are
Negative Developers on the midnight shift, received 8 hours
pay for Washington's Birthday 1969. But they received only a
total of only 40 hours pay for the week in which that holiday
fell, because, though the holiday fell on Saturday of that
week, the Laboratory worked only four of the week days (Monday
through Thursday). The issue in dispute involves the Onion's
claim on behalf of the grievants for a sixth day of pay for
that week, on the theory that the grievants were entitled to
a guarantee of 40 hours work and pay, Monday through Friday,

*•• '

- 2whether or not the Laboratory worked each of those days, plus
holiday pay for the holiday which fell on Saturday. So, more
accurately the issue is:
Are the grievants entitled to a sixth day of pay
(of 8 boure) for the week in which Washington's
Birthday 1969 fell?
Under Section 5 of the contract, Washington's Birthday is
an enumerated holiday for which employees shall be paid without being required to work, provided they report for work any
day during the week in which it fell. What is pertinent is
Paragraph (b) thereof which readsj
Should any of the foregoing holidays fall on e
Saturday, employees shall be paid an extra day's
pay for the week in which said Saturday holiday
falls.
The Union contends that the grievants are "weekly employ
ees;" that as such they enjoy a guaranteed work week of 40
hours; and that therefore for the week in question their compensation should total that basic guarantee plus the extra day's
pay for that week for Washington's Birthday which fell on Saturday • or in other words * total of *ix days pay.
The Company concedes that the grievants are "weekly employees" but not among those weekly employees guaranteed 40
hours work or pay; that the Company has the right to operate
its Laboratory on less than a five day week basis; that the
grievants art, entitled to pay only for time worked; end therefore the total pay they received for the four days worked that
week plus the holiday pay equalled their full entitlement.
As I ••* it the pertinent contract provisions are
Section 12(a) and (e), and Section 18. The former read:

- 312. Weekly and Hourly Employees:
(a) nothing herein contained ahall be deemed
to have modified the rights and privileges
presently enjoyed by weekly employees. Employ«r shall not change the status of any employee
from weekly to hourly or from hourly to weekly without the Union's consent.
(e) Employees on negative developing operations ahall not be paid for time absent, but
the pay so deducted shall be divided equally
among the remaining employees of the operating
crew affected by said absence.
and the latter:
18. Kewsreel Makeup.
The present night crew engcged In Negative
Developing, Positive Developing, Make-up News
Timers and Make-up News Printers at De Luxe
will operate on the basis of a six-hour minimum dally call and a 40 hour cumulative guarantee on a five-day basis at straight time.
Though the Comp&ny concedes that certain 'Wekly employ•*«", specifically certain senior Timers, TlClemen and similarly highly skilled employees, enjoy a full week's pay guarantee whether the Laboratory works a full week or not. It
argues that the only contractual guarantee to the grlevants
Is the apportionment under Section 12(e) of the pay of an
absent Negative Developer among the employees of the crew
who report for work and who are affected by the absence. From
this the Company concludes that the grlevefits are entitled to
pay paly when they work and that no pay attaches to days
they are absent whether or not they are absent on their own
Initiative,

.
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or at here, because the Company decided to close the Laboratory.

And Section 18 Is considered inapplicable by the Com-

pany because the "newsreel work" under which it IB beaded, is
no longer part of the Company's business.

The Union's interpretations are different. It points
out that neither under Section 12 nor anywhere *ls* in the
contract is there a distinction between "weekly employees"
such as Timers and Tltlemen and the Negative Developers. And
that absent any contractual distinction, it is improper for
'the Company to accord a weekly guarantee to the former group
and deny it to the latter, especially in view of the explicit
language of Section 12(a). Moreover the Union does not accept
the Company's interpretation of the word "absent" in Section
12(e). It does not agree that an employee foreclosed from
working because the Laboratory has been closed, is "absent"
within the meaning of Section 12(e). And consequently the
Union concludes that one of the "rights and privileges" presently enjoyed by the grlevante, as weekly employees, is a
guarantee of pay except when they are absent within the meaning of Section 12(e) of the contract.
Alternatively the Union claims that the 40 hour weekly
guarantee as set forth in Section 18 of the contract is a
right and privilege which the grievants enjoy as weekly employees because they presently qualify under the conditions
and terms of that section; or, having undlsputedly once been
covered by Section 18, they may not now be deprived of their
rights thereunder without the Union's consent to a change in
their statue (per Section 12(a))even if the conditions of

- 5Section 18 are now not present In the Laboratory. Or in other
words, without the Union's consent any rights the grlevants
enjoyed because of their work on "newsreel makeup" they shall
continue to enjoy as "weekly employees" whether or not there
has been a material change In the nature o r quantity of the
Company's newsreel work.
In By view, the grievant's claim for a sixth day of pay
for the week In question, turns simply on whether they have a
guaranteed regular 40 hour work week.

If so they would be en-

titled to that guarantee for Monday through Friday of the week
In question, even though the Laboratory was closed on Friday;
plus a day's pay for Washington's Birthday which fell on Saturday.

If not, they were properly paid for the work perform-

ed plus the holiday.
I agree with the Onion's Interpretation of the word
"absent" in Section 12(e). Since that Section draws a distinction between those members of the operating crew who are
at work, and any employee thereof who Is "absent," It must
refer to the circumstances where the Laboratory is in operation and the "absent" employee is not at work due to his own
act, volition or incapacity. But clearly It does not apply
to a circumstance where an employee is ready, willing and
able to come to work, but cannot do so because the Laboratory
has been closed.

This is not to say that under proper cir-

cumstances the Company does not have the right to close down
its operations; but rather that If it does so, It cannot claim
that the employees who are unable to work thereby are "absent"
within the meaning of Section 12(e). But Section 12(a) and (e)

1

- 6are not enough in and of themselves to substantiate the Union's
claim that the grievants, as "weekly employees," are entitled
to a full week's pay guarantee. Rather, because Section 12(a)
only guarantees them a continuance of the rights and privileges
enjoyed by "weekly employees" and immunity from a change in
status without the Union's consent, the question of whether a
guaranteed work week is aaiong those protected rights and privileges, remains unanswered by Section 12.
The only pertinent contract language on the matter of a
guaranteed work week is Section 18. Therefore, in my judgment,
the grievants' right to any such guarantee over and above the
holiday pay depends on whether Section 18 applies to them.
There is no dispute that Section 18 once actively applied
to the grievants. It was during the years that the Company
handled a large and regular volume of daily or twice weekly
newsreel makeup work. At that time, as is now the case, the
grievants were members of the night crew, classified as Negative
Developers and worked at this Laboratory.

So as of May 23,

1966 when the present provisions of Section 12(a) and (e) were
negotiated the grievants did enjoy the weekly pay guarantee of
Section 18. As "weekly employees" they were not then distinguished under that category from other "weekly employees" such
as Timers and Titleaen, etc. The Company made the distinction
only when this type of newsreel work was either discontinued
or fell off sharply, some time in January 1968.

The Company

then deemed that its obligations under Section 18 to the
negative Developers were no longer applicable.

Its present

- 7position that Section 13 does not apply is based on the sauie
conclusion - that because there is no nevsreel work of the
type and quantity previously in existence, the grievants, who
may have enjoyed rights thereunder during an earlier period and
under different circumstances, lost those rights when those
circumstances changed.
Factually the evidence supports the Company's assertion
that any present newsreel work is markedly different in type
and quantity from what the grievants handled prior to January
1968.

It is now a very small part of their regular assignments;

whereas previously it was a significant part of their work. It
appears that the total quantity of any work which could be
classified generally as "newsreel" involves no more than a
total of a few minutes over any four week period. And while
this may well be a "newsreel" assignment I am not prepared to
conclude that it constitutes the type or quantity of the "newsreel makeup" work contemplated by Section 18. Ordinary logic
might therefore produce a conclusion that the rights and benefits under Section 18 are vitiated by the absence of conditions
contemplated by that Section. But I am constrained to find
that Section 12(a) of the contract dictates a different result.
Until January 1968 there is no dispute that the grievants
were covered by and enjoyed the benefits of Section 18, and
were as much "weekly employees" as any others so classified.
Under the contract in effect in January 1968, when the Company's newsreel makeup work case to an end, Section 12(a) of
the contract was the same as it is now.

It meant then that

for the life of that contract there could be no modification

0
- 8in the rights and privileges enjoyed by weekly employees and
any change in their status required the Union's consent.
It Is undisputed that at no time during the remaining
months of that contract, following the end of the newsreel
work, did the Union consent to any change in the status of
any of the employees covered by Section 18. So for the balance
of that contract, despite the significant change in the newsreel makeup work, the rights and privileges of the employees
under Section 18 and their status were not modified. And I
am unable to find that there was any change thereafter during
the negotiations or following the execution of the present contract. Section 12(a) was repeated In the present contract,
thereby preserving the rights and privileges that the grievants
and all other weekly employees enjoyed previously.

And their

previous status, unchanged because of the absence of any Union
consent, was similarly perpetuated. Also,significantly I believe, Section 18 was repeated in the new contract, even
though the newsreel work under which It is headed, at least in
the Company's view, was terminated almost 11 months earlier.
I can only conclude that it found Its way into the new agreement, not just to aubstantively cover the possibility of a resumption of the newsreel work, or as a mere oversight, but as
a continued recognition of the fact that the certain enumerated employees thereunder enjoyed rights protected by Section
12(a), which had not been changed over the 11 month period between the predecessor contract and the present agreement, nor
changed under the current contract because the Union had not
consented to any change in the status of those employees.

I- 9In chore, the change in the nevsreel work was not enough
to change their status, simply because Section 12 (a) requires
the Onion's consent to effectuate that change; and from the
time that Section 18 did apply, there has been no such consent.
And obviously, for an employee's status to be maintained, there
can be no diminution or deprivation of any of the rights or
privileges which attach to that status.
Therefore though the condition for which Section IS was
originally intended may no longer be present, the rights and
status of the employees, including the grievance, which they
acquired thereunder when it was actively applicable, are maintained not only by the continued inclusion of Section 18 in
the present contract, but by the express protection of Section

Accordingly the grievants are entitled to the 40 hour
cumulative guarantee on a 5 day basis at straight time set
forth in Section 18, and should have received 5 days pa> for
Monday through Friday of the week in which Washington's Birthday fell cm a Saturday, and in addition they should have received holiday pay for Saturday as a sixth day.

The Company

is directed to make payment thereof.

Eric/J. Schmertz,
Permanent Arbitrator
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Date

September 19, 1969
Mr. Donald E. Quigley
Personnel Director
De Luxe General, Inc.
850 Tenth Avenue
New York, New York
Arbitration No. 69-A23
(Complement - No. 11-12
Color Positive Developing
Machine)
Dear Don :
at

the end of £ h e i r s t day of hearing on September 17 ,
1969 is as follows:
Without prejudice to the rights of the
parties, and specifically without prejudice
to the rights of the Company under the third
sentence of Article 17 (c) , and without precedent for any other case , the Company shall
debug one side at a time with a crew of three
men, working separately. Six men shall not
work at the same tine.
(
When the debugging is completed, the Company
may run both sides together with a crew of five
iaen for two full back-to-back days. On the
next day the /Arbitrator shall observe.
If within the two days with a crew of five
men, there are mechanicc.1 problems, the procedure
will be to return to the debugging process with
three m»n on a aide until the machine is ready.
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Septeraber 19, 1969

At that time, the Company may operate for two
good days back-to-back with five men (at least
five hours will be a good day).
During this period there shall be no discipline for spoilage or mistake unless willful.
After the observation the parties ir.ay offer
testimony.
Sincerely,

Eric Rosenfelrl
ER/lr
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From The Desk Of
D. E. Sluss*
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
43-Duart

In the Matter 'of the Arbitration
between

E > J i Schmert z

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
Award

and

DuArt Laboratories

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The grievances involved in these cases (69A-16
and 69A-17) arc not arbitrable because they were
not filed for arbitration within the time limit
required by Section 15(b) of the contract.
-

The fee and, expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
borne by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

) .
) "'

On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Mric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case* 69A-16
69A-17

I

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR
, MOTION PICTURE FILM

_

_

LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

and
Award

DuArt Laboratories

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The grievances involved in these cases (69A-16
and 69A-17) are not arbitrable because they were
not filed for arbitration within the time limit
required by Section 15(b) of the contract.
The fee
borne
by and
the expenses
Union. of the Arbitrator shall be

Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October / 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

•

On this

)SS.

/ rf

ggl^S&SSMfis*

ted the -

Cases 69A-16
69A-17

J <;

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

L/

and

Opinion
Cases
69A-16
69A-17

DuArt Laboratories

The threshold issue is procedural, - namely, whether
the grievances filed by the Union are 'barred from arbitration on the merits by Section 15(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on September 24, 1969 at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to present their respective cases
on the arbitrability issue.

The Arbitrator's oath was ex-

pressly waived.
The Union's grievances were set forth in telegrams
dated May 21 and 22, 1969 to the Company which read in pertinent part respectively as follows:
We are in dispute with DuArt Laboratories ....
regarding C Printer in Color Printing Section.
We are in dispute with DuArt Film Laboratories ...
regarding the elimination of a foremanship in
Printing Room.
By letter dated June 25, 1969 to the Undersigned, Counsel
for the Union referred these grievances to arbitration.
Section 15(b) of the contract reads:
Should the employer and the Union be unable to
resolve the dispute within five working days
after written notice of said dispute has been
served, either party may refer the matter to
Eric J. Schmertz, Esq., as permanent arbitrator.

\l 702, Motion Picture Laboratory

- 2 -

'

In any event, the request for arbitration to
the arbitrator must be made within thirty (30)
days after the giving or receipt o£ written
notice of such dispute, otherwise the right to
arbitrate is waived. The permanent arbitrator
shall render his decision within ten (10) days
of the final hearing of the dispute. (Underscoring supplied.)

J
i-^

^ Based on the foregoing contract language I have no
choice but to uphold the Company's contention that the grievances are not arbitrable.

There is n(o doubt that the "30

days" referred to in Section 15 (b) means calendar days. For
elsewhere in the contract where the parties intended a time
limit to include only working days, or where Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays are excluded, the language so states
explicitly.
In the instant case the grievances were presented to
the Company on May 21 and 22 respectively, but were not referred to arbitration until June 25, or beyond the 30 calendar days required by Section 15(b).
The language of Section 15(b), which the parties negotiated as part of their Collective Agreement, is not only
clear but mandatory.

It leaves no discretion in the hands

of the Arbitrator, and allows for no exceptions.

It states

that the requests for arbitration must be made within 30
days after notice of the dispute.

And it goes on to provide

that failure to do so in any event constitutes a waiver of
the right to arbitrate.

The phrase "in any event" ousts

the Arbitrator from considering the reasons or even extenuating circumstances which may have prevented the Union from
filing for arbitration within the time limit.

-

-

- 3 -
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I remind the parties that the language of Section 15 (.b)

i
is what they themselves negotiated, and what they agreed to
V_--

'

as part of the contract bargain.

ted by the parties.

As the Arbitrator under

J \s contra

It is my task to interpret and enforce

those terms and conditions, not to vary them.

In the face

of the explicit language of Section 15(b), for me to allow
these grievances to be arbitrated on the merits though they
were not filed for arbitration within the required 30 days,
would be to change the provisions of Section 15(b) of the
contract, no matter if I felt the Union's explanation to be
.1
reasonable.
With the foregoing decision, Section 15(b) has been interpreted and applied as requested by the Company.

Therefore

there is no doubt as to the meaning and application of that
Section in this case and in connection with the processing of
future grievances to arbitration during my term as Permanent

\.

and will continue to be preserved.
With that done it seems to me that the Company might be
amenable to a recommendation, applicable solely to the two
v—-

grievances involved in this dispute.

It is, without any change

in my Award so far as the meaning of Section 15(b) is cortcern-

,

ed, but in the interest of amicable labor relations, that these
grievances now be arbitrated on their merits, without creating

!

any procedural precedent whatsoever for the future.

i

As this

recommendation in no way alters my Award, it is for the Company, in its discretion, to decide whether it wishes to agree.

In sh

.
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;

If not, arbitration of the instant two grievances is barred.
If willing to accept the recommendation the Company would,
solely for these two grievances, waive the application of my
procedural Award.
In my view, since the Union's delay was not excessive,

J

but only 3 and 4 days beyond the limit, the cause of sound
labor relations might best be served if, in this instance,
the Company agreed to permit these matters to be arbitrated
on their merits; with the clear understanding that the Union
is hereafter bound without exception to the time limits of
Section 15(b).
.1
I ask the Company to let me know what it wishes to do.

fau^L<C^<L*u^X
Eric J/ 'Schmertz
*
Permanent Arbitrator

!
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100-ie JAMAICA AVENUE
JAMAICA, NEW YORK 11432
LEONARD COOPER
MICHAEL J. LAZAR
EDWIN OOLD

July 8, 1969
Eric J. Schmertt, Esq.
122 East 42nd Street
New York . NY 1001T
Re: Local 702 and DuArt Laboratories
(The simultaneous Operation of two (C) printers in the
Color Printing section);
(Unilateral elimination of a foreman's job in the
printing room).
Dear Mr. Schmerts:
This office represents Du Art Film Laboratories Inc. In response to
both your letters of July 2, 1969, be adrised that in accordance with
Article I5(b) of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the company and the union, more than thirty days hare elapsed since
written notice of the dispute was served upon my client by the onion.
Enclosed find copies of two telegrams sent by the union to my client.
Please note that these telegrams notify the company that a dispute
exists relative to the above two issues and are dated respectively
May 21 and May 22. 1969. Enclosed also find copy of letter dated
June 25, 1969 addressed to you asking that the disputes be scheduled
for arbitration.
•
In accordance with Article 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
I respectfully submit that the union's right to arbitrate has been waived
and that it may not further pursue the above matters.
Very truly yours,

Leonard Cooper
Ic/fw
ec: E. Nicholas Pinto, Esq.
Du Art Film Laboratotes Inc.

I
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 792, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

('/-/>
Aware

De Luxe General, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designateo in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into oy
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard tnt proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
There was just cause for the three day suspensions
of George Mottola and Rudy Sirnolin. There was not
just cause for the three day suspension of Vincent
Licari. Licari's suspension is reversed and he
shall be paid for the time lost.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be Dome 2/3 by tht
Union and 1/3 by the Company.

•it/lAXX*!

Eric
Schser
;i tz
*
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
)BS.
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this 3f day of October, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to ae to bt
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the sane.
Case #69A-13

£
J

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

De Luxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the three day suspension
of George Mottola, Vincent Licari and Rudy Simolin?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on September
9, 1969, at which time representatives of the Company snd
Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross exaxine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath

and the contractual time limit for the rendition of the Award.
Post hearing briefs were filed.
The three grievants were suspended (together with seven
others whose suspensions are not contested by the Union) for
refusals to work overtime on Friday, February 21, 1969.
The Company contends that grievants Licari and Siaoliri
agreed to work that day, as evidenced by their names appearing on a list prepared by the working foreman1, but that they
refused and failed to do so despite requests by the Company,
and warnings of disciplinary action.

The Company asserts

that grievant Mottola was directed to report for work that
day (as the Company needed one more employee in addition to
those nine whose names appeared on the foreman's list) but

- 2 that he failed and refused to do so despite the Company's repeated requests and warnings of disciplinary action.
The Union contends that the names of Licari and Simolin
were placed on the foreman's list without their authorization;
specifically, that Licari, when asked by the foreman if he
would be willing to work the overtime, responded that ho
first would have to check with his wife, and therefore neither
*
gave nor was requested by the foreman for final ansver; and
that Simolin was not asked at all.

The Union's position

with regard to Mottola is that his selection was tnar.catorily
imposed on him, contrary to the voluntary selection procedure agreed to by the Union and the Company for the conpila •
tion of the foreman's list.
These are disciplinary grievancefo, with the burden on
the Company to establish the grievants' wrongdoing.

I am

persuaded that the Company has met this buroen with regard
to Mottola and Simolin but not in the case of Licari.
I agree with the Company's assertion that there i= a
presumption in favor of the accuracy of the list prepared
by the working foreman.

The presumption is that the names

appearing thereon are of employees who voluntarily agreed
to work the day in question, as solicited by the foreman.
And having voluntarily agreed, the employees are so bound.
But obviously the presumption cannot be irrebuttable.
Licari testified that when asked if he would work the overtime, he responded that he would first have to check vith
his wife to see if they had other plans.

He stated that

thereafter he did not tell the foreman that he would work,

- 3 nor was he asked for a final answer; and that accordingly his
name, indicating an agreement to work, was imoroperly olaced
on the list.
sumotion.

Standing alone this testimony rebuts the pre-

The Company offered no direct evidence- contrary

to Licari's testimony.

The working foreman who prepared the

list did not testify (and I am not persuaded that merely because he is a member of the Union he would not have testified
truthfully if called) nor could any other Comoany witnesses
place Licari (who worked the night shift) at any of the
meetings between Comoany representatives and the affectea
employees at which the latter were urged, at the risk of
disciplinary action, to perform the overtime work.

So I

find no direct evidence which would impute to Licari knoviedge that his name was on the list and/or notice to hi-.ii
that he had better work or be disciplined. Therefore the
Company has not established to my satisfaction any wrongdoing
on the part of Licari.
The evidence is different with regard to Sitiulin.
worked the day shift.

He

Testimony by the Company placed him

at meetings, with the other affected day shift employees,
at which those employees were requested and directed to
work pursuant to the list compiled by the foreman, and were
warned of disciplinary action if they refused.

That testi-

mony together with the presumption in favor of the foreman's list stands unrebutted.

Simolin did not testify at

the hearing (he is now retired).

The Union offered only

secondary evidence, namely testimony that Simolin advisee

- 4 the Union that he was never asked by the foreman if ht wished to work overtime.

Weighing the evidence on this point,

the testimony advanced by the Company is obviously more probative.

Accordingly, I conclude that Simolin placed his

name on the list,thereby agreeing to work, and thereafter
despite requests by the Company and a warning oi cisciplinary
action, refused to work the overtime.

Therefore his thite

day suspension is upheld.
I find it immaterial whether or not Mottola's ai^i_;r.ment was consistent with the Union-Company agreement 31: hov
the men would be selected.

Confronted with a directive fro.n

the Company to work the day in question, Mottola should r,a ,-e
obeyed that order, and grieved had he or the Union thought
the order improper.

This is such a well settieo rule of

industrial relations that it need not be rc-iteratea her..-.
And the conditions which permit certain exception? tc triau
rule were not present in the instant situation.

So I auEt

reject the Union's contention that Mottola had a right tc
refuse the assignment because his selection was net on a
voluntary basis, or in accordance with agreed upon seniority.
In doing so I make no decision one way or the other or. the
question of whether the assignment of overtime wor*. is voluntary or may be mandatorily ordered; but only that a directive to work should be carried out, reserving to the grievant and to the Union the right to grieve the propriety of
such a directive.

Accordingly, Mottola's three day suspen-

sion is upheld.

Eric f. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

ii

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

': In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
' Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., APL-CIO
''
;

and

Award

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.
The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties,and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
I find there is no presently effective agreement,
either under the contract or otherwise, covering
the performance of tape punching work. Accordingly I direct that the parties meet and attempt
to negotiate a written understanding covering
which employees are to be assigned to that work '
and their rate of pay. The parties shall have
30 calendar days in which to negotiate that agreement. If an agreement is reached, its wage provisions shall be retroactive to the date of the
instant grievance. If an agreement te not reached within 30 calendar days the matter shall be referred back to me for a final and binding determination. Pending the negotiation of an agreement
or my determination, the tape punching work shall
continue to be performed by the expediters at the
expediter rate of pay.
The Arbitrator's fee and room rental expense for
the first hearing, which was adjourned at the Company's request, shall be borne by the Company.
The balance of the Arbitrator's fee and the room
rental expense for the second hearing shall be
-.- shared equally by the Company and the Union.

V '

^uX
•
Eric
Permanent Arbitrator
_

i
DATED: November ^*1969
STATE OF Hew York
)
COUNTY OF New York )
On this /^day of November, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schtnertz to me known and known to
as to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case * 69A-14

•

-'
.

'
-

-

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Notion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Under the circumstances presented, may a man
classified in one Job occupation regularly perform duties of another job occupation? If not
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were scheduled or held at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on September 11 and October
20, 1969. Representatives of the above named parties appear*
ed and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition
of the Award were expressly waived by the parties.
Specifically, the dispute involves the perforrjance of
"tape punching" by employees classified as "expediters."
It is conceded that tape punching is not one of the
regular duties of the expediter classification. The evidence
discloses, however, that that particular assignment has been
performed by the expediters at the expediter rate of pay,

V

since that classification was established in 1959. The Company asserts that its assignment of tape punching to expediters was and has been in accordance with an oral agreement
reached in 1959 between the Company and the then Union leader-

.**- ' . -'"

1
- 2•hip; that the tape punching work has been performed primarily by expediters in accordance with that agreement consistently over the years; and that the Union is bound by it.
It ia the Union's position that it knows of no euch
agreement; that a search of its files fails to disclose any
notation or record of such an understanding with the Company.
It contends that, as at certain laboratories cited, tape
punching should be performed by employees of the timing department or by the Control Strip Cutters (Kiscellaneouc) at
the rate of $3.34 an hour.

(The expediter rate, at which the

employees are presently paid for tape punching, is $3.12 an
hour.)
I conclude that there is not now an effective agreement,
either under the contract or otherwise, covering the performance of the tape punching work.
Not only is it conceded that the work of tapa punching
is not one of the normal or regular duties of the expediter
classification, but the contract does not place ic within any
other classification or department. Consequently, except in
situations involving a temporary transfer (which is not the
case here) the assignment of tape punching work on « regular
basis, to any job classification under the contract, including the expediters, changes the classification to vhich that
duty is attached. But except for certain circumstances, also
not present here, Section 4(h) of the contract prohibits
changes in existing classifications -"withaut the written consent of the Union."
The Company's reliance on an alleged 1959 agreement with

•

-.-..•

- 3the Union for the assignment of tape punching to expediters
is evidence of the Company's recognition that it could not
unilaterally and regularly assign to any particular job classification, a duty not encompassed therein.

I am persuaded

that an oral understanding was reached in 1959 between the
Company and the then Union leadership which authorized the performance of tape punching work by expediters at the expediter
rate of pay. I find that understanding to be valid and binding for the years that the employees worked under it, or until
the Union complained by its Instant grievance. In other words,
though oral it was not void. But it is no longer enforceable.
Because Section 4(h) of the contract requires the written conBent of the Union to changes In classification, that oral understanding may now be avoided by the Union.
This places the tape punching work in a "no man's land."
It is no longer properly assignable to the expediters because
the Union's grievance rescinds the prospectively unenforceable
1959 oral agreement. And neither the contract nor any other
agreement permits its regular assignment elsewhere. Therefore,
as the parties did in 1959, albeit imperfectly, and apparently
as the employers and the Union have done at other laboratories
throughout the Industry, the parties must now negotiate an
effective understanding covering the handling of the tape

V-

punching duties.
Accordingly I direct that the parties meet and attempt to
negotiate a written understanding covering which employees are
to be assigned to tape punching work and the rate to be paid
for that work. The parties shall have 30 calendar days in

i
-

•
.-•
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> - • -•*:*•-••

- 4which to negotiate that agreement.

If an agreement Is reach-

ed its wage provisions shall be retroactive to the date of
the instant grievance.

If an agreement is not reached within

30 calendar days the matter shall be referred back to me for
final and binding determination.

Pending the negotiation of

an agreement or my determination the tape punching work shall
continue to be performed by the expediters at the expediter
rate of pay.
^JL^f

Eric J: Schaertz
erz
*
Permanent Arbitrator

.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

and

Award

DuArt Fila Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Based on an agreed upon arrangement, the complement of the Gevachrotne machine shall be three
men.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the
Company.

r

trie J/Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED! December /^ 1969
STATE OF New York
) ,
COUNTY OF New York
) "
On this fo day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmert2 to ma known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

. . i . •. .•

.-•••/
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the proper complement of the
Gevachrorae machine?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on November 4, 1969
at which tine representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract tiiae limit for rendition of the Award.

The Union filed

a post hearing memorandum on November 20, 1969.
The Union contends that the Gevachroine machine should be
operated at all times with three men. The Company concedes
that three men are necessary when the "applicator" on the machine is used, but that when the machine is run without utilizing the applicator, only a crew of two is needed.
The Company asserts that the Gevachrome machine, when
operated without the applicator, is no different than the
Ektachrome machine (Pako) which runs with a crew of two, pursuant to the arbitration decision of July, 1966 of my predecessor, Mr. McMahon. \g&-(\\)
The Union argues that because the Gevachrome machine does
have an applicator it is different from the Ektachrome and the

- 2McMahon Award therefore is not controlling.
As I have indicated in prior decisions, any conflict between the provisions of the contract or an agreement between
the parties and the actual complement needed to run a machine
must be resolved in favor of the former.

So, if the contract

requires, or if the parties reached a prior mutual agreement
on the use of three men on this type of machine, it is beyond my authority to fix the crew at two men even if that is
all that is necessary to run the operation.
The Gevachrome machine is a color developing or processing machine with an attached applicator.

It is undisputed by

the Company that other color developing machines with applicators in the Laboratory, namely developing machines (1, #2 and
#3, are run with a crew of three when one strand is developed
and with a crew of five for two strands.

The testimony of

Messrs. Vitello and Kaufman, of the Union and Company respectively, coincide on one crucial point, and that is that by
agreement between the parties, color developing machines with
applicators are and have been ru-a with a crew of no less than
three men.
As I see it the question before me is whether this latter
referred to agreement applies to the Gevachrome machine, on
which the applicator is utilized only infrequently.
clude that It does.

I con-

The testimony discloses that at the time

color developing was introduced, the parties negotiated an
arrangement providing for a

minimum crew of three men on

color machines with applicators producing one strand of devel-

- 3oped film.

Mr. Vltello stated and Mr. Kaufman conceded that

this arrangement applied to machines with applicators, irrespective of the amount of time that the applicator was in use.
Accordingly, though two men may be all that is necessare to run the Gevachrome machine when the applicator is not
in use, I must find that the arrangement expressly agreed to
by the parties, which was not conditioned upon when or the
quantify of time that the applicator is used, preempts any
actual need to the contrary.

Thus the instant case is dis-

tinguished from the facts before Mr. McMahon which led to
his Award of July 14, 1966.

Eric /f. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
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